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Abstract
This paper exploits variation between and within countries to examine the
legacy of recorded conicts in Africa in the pre-colonial period between 1400 and
1700. There are three main ndings. First, we show that historical conict is
correlated with a greater prevalence of post-colonial conict. Second, historical
conict is correlated with lower levels of trust, a stronger sense of ethnic identity
and a weaker sense of national identity across countries. Third, historical conict
is negatively correlated with subsequent patterns of development looking at the
pattern across grid-cells within countries.
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Acts of violence, oppression, revolt, civil war, and so forth, chequer
the history of every African state. (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1940,
page 16))
1 Introduction
Understanding the causes and consequences of conict is now a major issue in study-
ing economic development.1 However, the relative importance of di¤erent factors in
generating conict remains open to debate. Perhaps the most robust observation is
that conicts are most prevalent in poor and weakly institutionalized countries. Many
factors which make a country susceptible to conict are, however, slow moving and the
two-way causation between conict and development creates a Gordian knot which is
hard to unpick.
Given the weakness of its economic performance in the post-independence period,
determinants of conict in Africa are of particular interest.2 Moreover, conict preva-
lence in Africa is comparatively high; the Armed Conict Database (ACD) measure
of civil conict based on a threshold of 1000 battle deaths suggests that around 8.5%
of country years in Africa since 1950 are conict years compared to around 5% of
country-years in the rest of the world over the same period.
But Africas history does not begin with colonialism and its legacy. The quote at
the start of this paper was an assessment made in 1940 by two leading anthropologists
venturing into a comparative analysis of African political organization. As emphasized
in Nunn (2008) among many others, slavery and its aftermath was a cornerstone of
organized political violence in Africa. But standard e¤orts to secure and maintain
territory and people also provided incentives for conict, particularly among and within
Africas historical kingdoms. Historical research on Africa between 1400 and 1700,
summarized in Brecke (1999) and based on written sources, conrms that conict
between its peoples is far from new.3
Prior to being carved up by colonial powers, Africa was divided into a patchwork
of tribal structures and proto-states (historical kingdoms) with heterogeneous political
systems. Some areas were under forms of territorial control which resembled states.
1See Blattman and Miguel (2009) for a comprehensive review.
2See Acemoglu and Robinson (2010), Bates (2008a,b), Collier and Gunning (1999) and Easterly
and Levine (1997) for discussions of African economic and political development.
3See also Reid (2012).
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However, other areas were closer to being stateless, some with acephalous forms of
political organization.4 The mantra of colonialism in Africa was indirect rule, an
attempt to control the hinterland by coopting traditional power structures into colonial
administration (see, for example, Lugard, 1922). This ensured a degree of continuity
between the pre-colonial and post-colonial eras. That said, some traditional power
structures were weakened by colonialism while others were strengthened.5 The biggest
impact on political geography was in the form of well-dened borders, initially between
the colonial powers and latterly between newly created independent states.
This paper investigates to what extent the post-colonial period saw a legacy from
conicts that are documented to have occurred in pre-colonial times. We use data
from Brecke (1999) to locate 91 conicts in Africa between 1400 and 1700. We focus
on the data in the period before 1700 since we are interested in conicts which predate
major European interest in colonizing Africa. We nd robust evidence that patterns of
conict after countries in Africa gained independence are correlated with having had
more historical conicts within their borders. We also nd some evidence supporting
the view that the mechanism at work may be a diminution in trust, and a weaker sense
of national identity. Persistent conict may also be due to the interaction between
geography, natural resources and patterns of settlement which spawn particular insti-
tutional arrangements although we nd no evidence of a link with weak institutions
at a country level. All of these factors are likely to make it more di¢ cult to estab-
lish cohesive governance arrangements which resolve conicts of interest in a peaceful
manner. We also use data at the sub-national level on conicts between 1997 and
2010 to show that having had an historical conict close by is positively correlated
with more recent conict. We also show that it is correlated with a lower level of
economic development. These results are robust to controlling for a wide variety of
other historical and geographical features of conict locations.
This paper belongs to an emerging body of research which traces the historical
roots of contemporary economic and political outcomes.6 Acemoglu, Johnson and
Robinson (2001) is the landmark contribution which brought to researchersattention
the correlation between historical settler mortality and contemporary income levels and
institutions around the world.
This paper is particularly related to a number of recent studies which have looked
4See Murdock (1967) who measures state structures above the local level for di¤erent ethnic groups.
5See Herbst (2000, Chapter 2) for discussion.
6See Nunn (2009) for an overview of such ndings.
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at persistent e¤ects of African history. Nunn (2008) nds a link between patterns of
contemporary development in Africa and the location of slave extraction. Nunn and
Wantchekon (2011) trace this to modern day attitudes towards trust in the Afro-
barometer survey. And Nunn (2010) nds a correlation between the location of
Christian missions and modern day outcomes. Exploiting historical data on polit-
ical geography, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2011) examine the consequences of
how Africa was partitioned between colonial powers and nd that partitioned ethnic
groups su¤ered greater conict compared to those which have not been impacted by
the border partition. Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) nd a link between the nature of the
pre-colonial regime and modern day provision of public goods. Michalopoulos and Pa-
paioannou (2013) nd a link between pre-colonial political centralization and regional
economic development. In common with this paper, they emphasize pre-colonial con-
tinuity in the form of political organization in a¤ecting the contemporary performance
of African states.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we dis-
cuss some background issues including our data and measurement. We then discuss
between-country evidence in section 3 and within-country (grid cell level) evidence in
section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Background
In this section, we rst discuss some of the background literature and explanations of
conict. Second, we discuss how this may suggest historical legacies from pre-colonial
conicts. Third, we introduce our historical conict data and its sources. And
fourth, we provide a brief overview of African political organization and conict in the
pre-colonial and colonial periods.
2.1 Political Violence
The standard economic approach to political violence looks for factors that explain
the costs and benets of using violence to achieve specic ends, particular in the form
of either remaining in power or mounting an insurgency.7 On this basis, four main
hypotheses are frequently proposed to explain why Africa is conict prone: (i) natural
7See Fearon (2008) for an excellent overview of the issues and Bates (2008a) for an interpretation
of the prevalence of conict in Africa and its origins.
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resource dependence, (ii) weak and poorly functioning political institutions, (ii) ethnic
fragmentation and polarization and (ii) endemic poverty. We briey review these four
strands of the literature.
Benets from using violence are frequently couched in terms of capturing resources
either directly, as in the capture of territory, or through winning political power. Both
of these views motivate exploring the link between violence and natural resource rents
as discussed in Ross (2004). Early empirical contributions to the literature on conict
such as Collier and Hoe­ er (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) nd evidence to
support this channel.
Since the use of violence is generally thought of as a last resort, civil wars are
usually rationalized in terms of commitment and/or information problems. The extent
of commitment power depends on the institutional structures in place. Besley and
Persson (2011a,b) model this as a constraint on the way that the state can be used for
private ends which they refer to as cohesive political institutions. This could be the
product of formal veto threats enhanced by Parliamentary democracy or by greater
trust between groups which foster more cooperative policy outcomes. This places an
emphasis on the role of institutions and/or trust in a¤ecting the likelihood of conict.
The way that citizens identify with the common good versus sectional interests could
also be important in shaping how institutions function to mitigate conict risk.
In Africa, much emphasis is placed on ethnicity as the salient cleavage which leads
to polarization and conict. However, the empirical results are somewhat equivocal.
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a) nd evidence that ethnic polarization, rather
than fractionalization, is positively correlated with conict. Moreover, this is consistent
with the theoretical approaches of Esteban and Ray (1999), Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol (2005b) and Besley and Persson (2011b, Chapter 4). Cederman et al (2013)
study the impact of cross-border ethnic groups on violent conict.
Endemic poverty reduces the opportunity cost of ghting. When there is unem-
ployment and/or low wages it should theoretically make it easier for each side in a
conict to recruit combatants. This ties to the robust nding in the existing empirical
literature that there is a negative correlation between income per capita and the preva-
lence of conict; see the discussion in Blattman and Miguel (2009) who also address
the issue of reverse causation. Conict can a¤ect development through a variety of
channels including incentives to invest in physical and human capital. It may also
a¤ect incentives to invest in state capacities to support investments as emphasized in
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Besley and Persson (2011b).
Most of the existing quantitative research which looks at the link between violence
and ethnicity treats the latter as given. However, the question of how individuals iden-
tify with groups and are motivated to commit violent acts in the name of furthering
that group interest is worthy of explanation and is arguably uid over time. Recent re-
search has begun to explore the logic of constructivist views of ethnic identity. Ahlerup
and Olsson (2011) o¤er an evolutionary perspective on these issues. Michalopoulos
(2011) explains ethnic diversity empirically in terms of variation in regional land qual-
ity and elevation. Caselli and Coleman (2011) develop a model of endogenous ethnic
identities and conict. These contributions t into a nascent interest in the economics
of identity pioneered by Akerlof and Kranton (2010). Arguably, the trend over time in
many countries has been a move away from identities based on smaller groups such as
clans, tribes or ethnicities towards identities forged around nation states. An impor-
tant issue is to understand how symbolic attachment and ritual can build and sustain
attachment to nations or ethnicities (see, for example, Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983).
The role of past conicts and the way that history portrays them can play a key role
in narratives which nurture particular identities.8
This paper contributes to a burgeoning literature that looks at the causes and conse-
quences of conict in Africa at the sub-national level. One of the earliest contributions
in this mode is Deininger (2003) who nds that the distance from infrastructure, asset
inequality, cash-cropping and lower levels of education increase the likelihood of civil
conict in Uganda. Akresh and de Walque (2010) examine the magnitude of the Rwan-
dan genocide on school attendance. Rohner et al (2011) study the e¤ect of conict in
Uganda in the period 2002-5 on trust and expressions of ethnic and national identity
and Ksoll et al (2010) study the disruptive e¤ect of political violence in Kenya on
the ower industry. Focusing on the causes of conict rather than its consequences,
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2011) show how Africas partition by colonial powers
a¤ects contemporary patterns of conict.
Such sub-national studies are attractive since they are able to control for common
country-level factors. More generally, they emphasize the need to look carefully at
within country heterogeneity and remind us that civil conict and political violence is
often geographically specic (Fearon and Laitin, 2010). Such is the case, for example,
with episodes of political violence in advanced countries such as with terrorism in the
8For an insightful discussion and critical review of di¤erent strands of thinking in this area see
Fearon and Laitin (2000).
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Basque country or Northern Ireland. Patterns of violence are even quite specic and
episodic in weakly institutionalized polities where violence is rife such as Colombia (see
Dube and Vargas, 2013).
2.2 Historical Legacies
A key issue in this paper is how events that took place centuries previously could inu-
ence in contemporary economic and political outcomes. Figure 1 suggests a schematic
conceptual framework drawing on factors outlined in the previous section.
First, historical conicts themselves have determinants in the social, political, ge-
ographic and economic context of regions at the time that the conicts took place.
One of the reasons for persistent conict may be the interaction between geography,
natural resources and settlement; areas that provide moderate climate and natural
resources attract human settlement.9 These settlements organize themselves in ways
that relate to the resources around them and create di¤erent institutions. These rela-
tively densely settled areas make it easier to organize armed conict and make it more
likely that su¢ cient people are killed to register this as a conict in our data. Land
disputes are often a particular source of contention in these instances as emphasized
in Toft (2003). And many of these such factors are likely to be most important when
studying sub-national conicts due to the localized nature of these factors.
Below, we will seek to control for some of these background factors directly. For
example, we will measure physical geography at the grid cell level and we will look at
the geography of political organization in the old kingdoms of Africa.
Second, conicts can a¤ect the evolution of subsequent economic, political and so-
cial outcomes which have a bearing on contemporary conict. For example, historical
conicts could promote distrust among social groups which a¤ect attitudes and identi-
ties. They could also have an economic legacy, making regions poorer and could also
inuence the choice of political institutions. We will attempt to test for some of these
channels below. However, it is quite di¢ cult to be sure that all of these proximate
determinants of more recent conicts can be satisfactorily measured. Hence, we will
end up with a somewhat reduced-forminterpretations of the ndings. Nonetheless,
we will use the framework in Figure 1, to anchor our discussion of the empirical ndings
9In tune with this view, Harari and La Ferrara (2012) nd convincing evidence of the importance
of climatic e¤ects as a determinant of conict looking at the geographical distribution of conict in
Africa.
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and the possible mechanisms at work.
2.3 Data and Measurement
Data on historical conicts in Africa is from the conict catalogue of Brecke (1999).
For Africa, this is based on three main published sources: Ajaye and Crowder (1985),
Freeman-Grenville (1973) and McEvedy (1995). Brekkes denition follows Cio¢ -
Revilla (1996) which uses Richardsons base 10 log scale for violent conicts  see
Richardson (1960).10 For each conict in Africa between 1400 and 1700 dened this
way, we have identied the modern country in which it took place as well as the specic
geographical location. Where possible, we have cross-checked each case by reading the
history of each war. We focus on the data in the period before 1700 since we are
interested in conicts which predate major European interest in colonizing Africa.
Even if there are conicts that have not been documented, we are condent that the
catalogue includes the most important conicts in Africa which have been written
about by historians.11 However, we are not aware of any similarly comprehensive
e¤ort to document historical conict in Africa with which to compare these data.
Although we focus on Africa, Brecke (1999) covers the universe of documented
violent conicts in which 32 or more people have died at any location in the world since
1400. The data are now being used by a number of researchers to explore the causes
and consequences of conict. For example, Zhang et al (2007) uses them to explore at a
macro scale the e¤ects of climate change on the outbreak of war and population decline
in the preindustrial era. Iyigun (2008) uses conict catalogue for Europe between 1401
and 1700 to show that the incidence of military arrangements between the protestant
reformers and Counter-Reformists between 1520 and 1650 depends negatively on the
Ottomansmilitary activity in Europe. Iyigun, Nunn and Qian (2010), use the data
over the period 1400 and 2000 to look at the determinants of conicts. They nd,
as many recent studies which use data on contemporaneous conict, a link between
economic shocks and violent conict. Pinker (2011) uses the conict catalogue for his
discussion of violence in human history. This nascent use of the data by researchers
means that it will come under increasing scrutiny as a potentially valuable resource to
researchers interested in historical conict.
10The criterion of 32 deaths corresponds to a Richardson score of 1.5.
11Of course, the direction of causation could run in the other direction, from contemporary conict
to uncovering historical examples. A salutory example is the controversy begun by Cobbing (1988)
over the historiography of the Mfecane and whether it was used to justify colonial oppression.
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The data in the conict catalogue treat as multi-year conicts consecutive years
in which that threshold of 32 deaths is surpassed. They follow Luard (1987) in using
400AD as the cuto¤ date since it falls between major dates for the Chinese (1366) and
European and American (1492) populations, and demarcates a point before which the
quality and extent of data about many parts of the world falls precipitously.
For the between-country analysis, the main variable that we use is the prevalence
of violent conict in a country between 1400 and 1700, specically the number of years
between 1400 and 1700 in which some area within the country is coded as having
been in what would now be regarded as an internal conict.12 This variable captures
the intensity of pre-colonial conict and has a mean of 5.13 years with a range 0 to
91 years and a standard deviation of 15.17 years. As a blunter measure, we also
construct a dummy variable which is equal to one if the country has had any violent
conict between 1400 and 1700, and zero otherwise.
When we study conict at the sub-national level, we take the 120km120km grids
from the Yale University Geographically Base Economic Dataset (G-econ). Since some
grids traverse country boundaries, gives 3546 country-grid cells (hereafter simply grid
cells) spread across 49 countries in Africa.13 For each grid cell in the data, we
construct a dummy variable which is equal to one if there has been a conict in that
grid cell in the period 1400-1700 and zero otherwise. For the purposes of this exercise,
we GIS code each conict within a modern country the conict occurred.14 Figure 2
12For years where there are overlapping conicts, we add these up to get our total years measure.
However, there are very few such cases and the results do not change if we treat such years as a single
conict.
13We use G-econ 3.1; see http://gecon.yale.edu/ for details on the grid construction and available
data. The dataset codies grids that straddle country borders as separate observations. Such grids
are therefore smaller than 120km120km in size.
14We use, in particular, Ade Ajayi and Crowder (1985) and Freeman-Grenville (1973) and use the
following rules to locate conicts:
1. When there is only one place named in the conict, the conict is assigned to that place.
2. When there is more than one place named in he description of the conict but there is informa-
tion on date at which one group is attacking or defending, we assign the location as the place
where the attack is listed as having taken place.
3. If the exact location is not named, we use the name of the conict (by country, town or group
listed as being involved in the conict). We then search other resources (on line and in libraries)
to nd the precise location.
4. If the place is listed as a region, we assign the location to be the capital of that region or empire.
A full list of the conicts that we use and the way we have assigned them to locations is in Appendix
table A.8.
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plots the 91 conicts between 1400 and 1700 that we have located precisely and which
we will exploit in this analysis. The sizes of the dots reect the number of conicts at
each location where more than one conict is recorded at the same location.
We then match these data with information on the location of recent conicts from
the Armed Conict and Location Event Data (ACLED).15 These data give a precise
GIS code for conict locations in African countries for the years 1997 to 2010.16 The
dataset contains information on the date and location of conict events, the nature of
the event, and the groups involved.
The G-econ data provide a number of additional variables which we use as controls.
We augment these with data that we have extracted from historical maps which we
detail below.
Table 1 gives descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the analysis below
both at the country level and the grid-cell level. We do so comparing the sample
of countries/grid cells which had an historical conict to obtain a feel for whether
there are obvious cross-sectional di¤erences among these two groups. Looking at
the rst panel at the country level, Table 1 shows that there is a mean di¤erence in
years of post-independence conict of around 2.4 years between countries that had an
historical conict compared to those that did not. Historical conicts occur in areas
that were more densely populated in 1400. However, there is no obvious di¤erence
in mean income and expropriation risk. The second panel, at the grid-cell level,
shows a mean di¤erence in conict between 1997 and 2010 of about 50 percentage
points with 84 percent of the grid-cells with an historical conict having a more recent
conict compared to 39 percent of those among the grid-cells with no historical conict.
Historical conict appears to occur in areas that are more densely populated areas.
Moreover, historical conict seems more likely to occur in grid-cells where the current
capital city is located and where there were cities in 1400. The mean di¤erence in
light density across the grid cells with and without an historical conict is consistent
with this.
2.4 Conict and Political Development in the History of Africa
Prior to the scramble for Africa in the late nineteenth century culminating in the Berlin
conference of 1884, Africa was characterized by a patch work of heterogeneous political
15See http://www.acleddata.com/
16Such precise data is not available for the whole post-colonial period.
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systems. Some of these were organized authority structures of long-standing including
a number of historical kingdoms. Other areas were governed in a relatively stateless
fashion. Just as in Medieval Europe, the conicts that we study were in part a reection
of the process of indigenous state building. This was true, for example, of the Bunyoro-
Buganda conict in modern day Uganda in 1600 or the Songhai-Gourma conict in
modern day Mali in 1488, both of which appear in our data. Civil wars within kingdoms
were common too (see, for example, Ben-Amos Girshick and Thornton, 2001). Of
course, conicts in organized political jurisdictions are also more likely to form part
of the historical record. Anthropologists who have studied African political history
draw a similar conclusion on the importance of territorial war in Africa. For example,
Radcli¤e-Brown (1940) notes that:
Amongst the various di¤erent kinds of warfare that can be distin-
guished, what we may call wars of conquest have been important in Africa,
as they have been in Europe. When such war is successful it establishes one
people as conquerors over another who are thus incorporated into a larger
political society, sometimes in an inferior position as a subject people.
(page xix).
This process of territorial consolidation lead, at various points in history, to the emer-
gence of a variety of long-lived African kingdoms whose geographical reach is displayed
in the hatched areas in Figure 2.17 The map identies 23 historical kingdoms in
Africa.18 Herbst (2000, Chapter 2) argues that these kingdoms found it di¢ cult to
consolidate power over wide areas because of the ease with which populations could
migrate. Thus, the limits and territorial boundaries of such kingdoms were somewhat
porous. Examining the locations of the dots which represent conict locations, it is
apparent that there is link between conict and belonging to the territory of an histor-
ical kingdom; conicts are twice as likely to occur in grid cells which belong to historic
kingdoms compared to those which do not.
As European powers somewhat reluctantly extended their rule into the African hin-
terland, signicant use was made of pre-colonial power structures in e¤orts at indirect
17This is based on maps in OBrien (1999).
18These are Zulu, Merina, Monomotapa, Lozi, Malawi, Kilwa, Lunda, Congo, Luba, Rwanda,
Buganda, Ashanti, Yoruba, Ethiopia, Axum, Wolof, Ghana, Mali, Kush, Songhay, Kanem, Classi-
cal Egypt and Carthage. Some of the kingdoms of West Africa were overlapping geographically but
not temporally.
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rule. But this process showed little respect for historic territorial boundaries. This too
is apparent in Figure 2 where we have shaded countries according to colonial control
by World War I which is largely a reection of the aftermath of the 1884 Berlin con-
ference. The map conrms that patterns of colonial control did not seem to respect
the boundaries of historical kingdoms.
One of the most signicant organizational changes in Africa from the colonial period
onwards was the creation and maintenance of political jurisdictions with clearly dened
boundaries throughout the continent. As discussed in Herbst (2000), colonialism also
had a signicant e¤ect on the way that the proto-state structures that preceded it
operated. Much of this actually weakened existing authority structures that had been
created in pre-colonial times.19 And this may help to explain why the positive role of
historical conicts in state building identied by Hintze (1911) and Tilly (1990) to be
sources of European state strength are much less important in an African context.
The end of colonialism ushered in an era of mostly contrived nation state bound-
aries which therefore bore little relation to indigenous political structures, largely as
a reection of the arbitrariness of the boundaries created by the colonial division of
Africa. On independence, most countries launched e¤orts to build nation states inside
these well-dened boundaries broadcasting their intentions through national symbols
such as ags, currencies and citizenship regulations. The great challenge, which has so
often not been met, is to move beyond symbolism to create functional polities within
state borders that can deliver public goods and security to their citizens. Referring to
the salience of historical conict in this process, Bates (2008a) remarks that
past conquests by monarchs and warriors created territorial disputes
that reverberate to this day and so shape contemporary politics.(page 85)
This, he argues, along with migration to secure agricultural land sow the seeds of
modern day political tensions behind much contemporary conict. A similar sentiment
about the importance of history is echoed in Reid (2012) which surveys the history of
conict in Africa from BCE to the present day and remarks that
The past was very much present in the organization of violence, even
during the revolutionary upheaval of the nineteenth century and the self-
consciously modernist struggles of the mid-twentieth century. States and
19In fact, there is heterogeneity in the impact depending on initial conditions. It is likely that in
the case where societies were initially stateless, colonialism strengethened the state (see, for example,
Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, 1940).
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societies sought historical precedent and heroic forebears, both for inspira-
tion and solace, and constructed both oral and written narratives .. for the
purpose.(page 10)
It is also clear from his account that a number of historical conicts are well-documented
and potentially salient in modern times.
This point can be illustrated for our data with reference to Figure 2 using the
example of the Harari region in Ethiopia. Much of the conict between 1400 and 1700
was due to the Islamic city of Harars e¤orts to repel the spread of Christian inuence
and a struggle to control lucrative trade routes. The city of Harar which was dominated
by the Harari, known as Ge usu(people of the city), was eventually incorporated into
the Ethiopian state in 1887. It is now a multi-ethnic region in which the Harari,
who comprise less than 10% of the population, have disproportionate political power
in coalition with a larger ethnic group (the Oromo). The status of the Harari remains
a source of tension within the region.
3 Between-country Evidence
We are interested in whether historical conict is correlated with the prevalence of civil
conict and other outcomes in a country during its post-independence history. Our
basic specication is as follows:
yj = + cj + xj + "j
where yj is the outcome of interest in country j,  is the intercept, cj is the historical
conict variable and xj are other controls which we describe as we go. Regional and
colonial dummies are included in all specications.
Core Results The main cross-country results are reported in Table 2. The outcome
variable in columns (1) and (2) is the prevalence of civil war between independence
and 2007 measured using the Armed Conict Database (ACD). Column (1) controls
only for regional and colonial dummies and nds a positive and signicant correlation
between the intensity of historical conicts within a country and more recent experi-
ence. For each additional year of an historical conict, the country su¤ers an extra
0.12 years (or about 2 months) of additional conict in the post-independence period.
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Put another way, comparing a country with no history of conict in the period 1400 to
1700 to one with 60 years of conict over this period, then our point estimate predicts
an additional 10 years of post-independence conict.
In column (2), we add additional controls: GDP per capita in 1970, latitude, lon-
gitude, minimum rainfall, maximum humidity, low temperature, the log of the length
of the coastline, a dummy for whether a country is an island, measures of natural
resource abundance,20 legal origin, ethnic polarization,21 proportion of the population
that is Muslim, a dummy for yellow fever, and the ruggedness of the terrain. We
lose two country observations due to missing data. However, the correlation between
post-independence conict and historical conict prevalence is essentially the same.
The next four columns in Table 2 are motivated by the study of political violence
in Besley and Persson (2011a). They argue that, from a theoretical point of view, gov-
ernment repression and conict are two sides of a coin and should be studied jointly.
We follow them and measure repression using Banks(2005) measure of the extent of
purges i.e., the removal, by jailing or assassination, of opponents considered unde-
sirable by the incumbent government. Column (3) shows that countries with a prior
history of conict are more likely to su¤er from this form of political violence too. And
this result is robust to adding additional controls (column 4). In columns (5) and (6)
we run some ordered logits where the ordered variable takes on the value zero when
there is no violence, a value of one if there is repression and a value of two if there
is conict. The results also show that there is a signicantly higher prevalence of
political violence when a country has a history of conict and that this is robust to
including controls.
In column (7), we include the slave trade variable from Nunn (2008) along with
population density in 1400.22 The former is included to guard against the possibility
that the between-group breakdown in trust that slavery may have caused is not driving
20We use the log of diamond, gold and oil production per head of population from Nunn (2008).
21Unlike Nunn (2008), we use ethnic polarization rather than ethnic fractionalization. This is
because Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a) have found that ethnic polarization rather than frac-
tionalization is correlated with civil conict. Like them, we use the index rst introduced for religious
polarization in Reynal-Querol (2002). For N ethnic groups with population share i, it is:
1 
NX
i=1

0:5  i
0:5
2
i:
Esteban and Ray (1994) is the rst attempt to provide a precise denition of polarization.
22This variable comes from Nunn and Puga (2012). They construct the data using historical pop-
ulation estimates from McEvedy and Jones (1978).
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our result. While slavery is positively correlated with subsequent civil conict, it does
not disrupt the correlation with war prevalence between 1400 and 1700. Including
population density in 1400 as a control addresses the possibility that the correlation
between historical war prevalence and recent civil war is confounded by a country
with more historical conicts having been more densely populated at the time. In
fact, there is no signicant correlation between population density in 1400 and recent
conict. Adding these controls also leaves our results on purges and the ordered conict
variable robust as columns (8) and (9) demonstrate.23
Taken together these results paint a robust picture linking the legacy of conict in a
country in the period 1400-1700 with recent conict and political violence.24 Moreover,
this e¤ect survives the inclusion of a wide variety of controls.
Income Levels and Institutions Table 3 begins our exploration of possible mech-
anisms as sketched in Figure 1. The theoretical literature on conict identies low
income as a risk factor and also emphasizes how conict may reduce incentives to invest
and can destroy assets.25 Columns (1) through (3) in Table 2 explore whether historical
conict is correlated with low income in the post-colonial period. In all three columns,
there is a negative correlation between the historical conict variable and income per
capita but it is only signicant (at a 10% level) in column (2). The magnitude of the
point estimate suggests that a country with a history of pre-colonial conict at around
its mean will have a 5% lower level of per capita GDP in 2000, compare with a country
that has had no historical conicts between 1400 and 1700.26 The coe¢ cient is similar
in size and signicance when other controls are included, such as the slave extraction
variable of Nunn (2008). This provides some weak evidence that there may be a chan-
nel through economic e¤ects but it is quite possible that this is simply a reection of
the fact that the higher prevalence of post-colonial conict identied in Table 1 is also
having a negative e¤ect on the economy rather than via a direct e¤ect from historical
conict.
In columns (4) and (5) of Table 3, we look to see whether historical conict is
23The results are also robust to other measures of violence including a dummy for whether a country
has any conict since independence and the extent of casualties see the on-line Appendix Table A.1.
24The results are also robust to including the country-level pre-colonial centralization variable of
Gennaioli and Rainer (2007).
25For evidence on the negative impact on economic activity, see for example, Abadie and Gardeaz-
abal (2003), Besley and Mueller (2012), Blomberg and Hess (2002), Collier (1999), Goldin and Lewis
(1975) and Zussman, Zussman and Orregaard Nielsen (2008).
26The mean of the left hand side variable is 5 years so the e¤ect is calculated as 5(-0.01100)):
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correlated with two popular contemporary measures of the quality of the institutional
environment: expropriation risk and the strength of checks and balances. In column
(4), the dependent variable is the ICRG measure of expropriation risk which Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson (2001) argue is the channel through which settler mortality
a¤ects modern day per capita income. We nd no signicant correlation between this
variable at the country level and historical conict. Column (5) chooses the extent of
checks and balances from the PolityIV data which Besley and Persson (2011) argue is
a plausible way of capturing institutional cohesiveness. Here, we use a cut-o¤ value of
ve and above on the executive constraints scale of one through seven. Again, we nd
no signicant correlation between this variable and historical conict at the country
level. While the measures of institutions here are quite crude, these ndings are
not particularly encouraging to the view that historical conict creates a problematic
institutional legacy.27
Trust and Identity Table 4 uses the Afrobarometer survey to look at whether there
is an historical legacy of conict in shaping contemporary attitudes. This could well
be the case if the way that conicts are reported across generations a¤ects feelings
towards particular groups due to historical rivalries. It may also, for the same reason,
weaken attachments to nation states whose boundaries were largely created as a legacy
of colonialism. Such things are likely to matter in a¤ecting the way that institutional
arrangements for peaceful resolution of conict operate. Given any formal rules of
the game, beliefs and the way that they a¤ect a willingness to trust or cooperate may
assist in generating a negotiated outcome rather than resorting to violence.
The Afrobarometer is a household level survey which explores a host of attitudinal
questions among the citizens of African countries. The data that we use here are those
collected for 2008 (round 3 of the survey). These surveys are conducted for a total
of 25397 respondents in 18 countries: Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya,
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South
Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.28 Each survey tries to be representative
27The on-line Appendix shows that these ndings are robust to using di¤erent versions of the Penn
World Tables and measuring GDP at di¤erent dates. Tables A.2, A.3 and A.4 use two vintages of
the Penn World Tables as well as di¤erent dates for measuring GDP. We also explore the use of use
of a wide range of measures of institutions that have been suggested by various authors. There is no
evidence of a signicant correlation between them and historical conict at the country level.
28Nine of these countries had at least one historical conict: Benin, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar,
Mali, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.
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of the population and interviews are conducted in local languages. However, the survey
is not administered in areas with on-going conicts.
We look rst at inter-group trust where the survey asks how much the respondent
trusts people from other groups. Answers are given on a four point scale where
zero is "not at all", one is "just a little", two is "somewhat" and three is "a lot".
We use this categorical variable as our dependent variable. The result is shown in
column (1) of Table 4 where there is a negative correlation between trust and historical
conict. The specication that we use controls for a wide range of personal and country
characteristics which are listed in the notes to the Table. We also control for colonial
and regional dummies as well as GDP per capita at the country level. The standard
errors are clustered by village (the survey cluster for the data collection).29
In columns (2) and (3), we look at a di¤erent variable from the Afrobarometer
which reports self-ascribed identity. We create two dummy variables from the survey:
the rst is equal to one if an individual reports only having feelings about their ethnic
identity compared to all other feelings of identity and a second dummy variable which
takes the value one if an individual expresses only a sense of national identity.30 The
results of regressions using these dummies as dependent variables are reported in Table
4. Column (2) shows that there is a positive and signicant correlation between having
only a sense of ethnic identity and the extent of historical conict within a country.
Column (3) shows a weaker sense of national identity which is simply the ip side of
column (2) since it is derived from the same ordered variable as the ethnic identity
variable. Once again, we control for a wide variety of personal characteristics, and
all control variables that we use in table 1 and 2. These results are consistent with
the idea that ethnic and national identities are in part constructed by salient historical
events.
Taken together, the results in columns (1) to (3) in Table 4 give credence to the view
that having had historical conicts reduces trust between groups as well as a¤ecting
citizens sense of identity. That said, it is possible that is mostly a reection of
contemporary rather than historical conict, especially given that we have already
shown that such conicts are positively correlated. To gain some reassurance that the
e¤ect is due to documented historical conicts, columns (4), (5) and (6) repeat the
29The results are robust to using an ordered logit specication. Similar results are found for trust
in the local council, neighbors, family and within-group.
30The underlying variable takes on ve possible values: ethnic identity only, ethnic identity more
than national identity, national and ethnic identities equally, national identity more than ethnic iden-
tity and national identity only.
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specications in columns (1) through (3) while including the left hand side variables
from Table 1 (the prevalence of post-colonial civil conict) as a right hand side variable
in explaining trust and identity. The historical conict variables remain signicant
and of similar magnitude while contemporary conict is not signicant. These results
provide some suggestive evidence that historical conicts may play a role in shaping
attitudes more than contemporary conict even though the latter is correlated with
historical conict. However, there is the usual concern with cross-country variation
that the variable of interested is correlated with omitted variables.31
Summing Up These results provide some encouragement to the view that historical
conict in the period 1400-1700 has a legacy at the country level both in terms of
conict and attitudes. In terms of the framework suggested in Figure 1, we nd evidence
of a link mediated through a changing sense of national identity rather than economic
outcomes or choice of institutions.
4 Within-country evidence
We now turn to looking at evidence which exploits the more precise location of recent
and historical conicts. Specically, we will exploit only within-country variation and
include a country xed e¤ect to capture common country-level factors such as the level
of development or national political institutions. We will look at the a correlation
between historical conict and two outcomes: (i) more recent conict and (ii) the level
of economic development across geographic areas within a country.32
For this exercise, we use the grid cells whose construction we described in section
2.2 above. We construct a dummy variable that captures whether the grid cell had a
conict located in it between 1400 and 1700. Our core empirical specication is:
yj` = j + dj` + xj` + "j` (1)
where yj` is the outcome measure in grid cell ` in country j, j is a country xed e¤ect,
31The on-line Appendix (Table A.6) calculates ratios as suggested in Altonji et al (2005) to assess
this. They range from 2 to 6.5 in the cross country results, and between 1.15 amd 4 in the within
country analysis.
32We cannot use the Afrobarometer data to look at trust and identity at the grid level that we use
since these surveys explicitly avoid conict areas and hence we would not get a representative picture
for our purposes.
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dj` is either our old conict dummy which is equal to one if there was an historical
conict in grid cell ` in country j, and xj` are other grid cell controls. Standard errors
are clustered at the country level. Throughout, we use the log of population density
in a grid cell as a control since both of our outcome measures are likely to be strongly
related to this.33 Other control variables in xj` are described as we introduce them
with their sources/construction documented in the text and/or in footnotes.
We use two di¤erent outcome measures. The rst is a dummy variable which is
equal to one if grid cell ` in country j is the site of a conict between 1997 and 2010 as
reported in the ACLED data. The second captures the level of economic development
in a grid cell. Since good data on income per capita are di¢ cult to nd at the grid
cell level, we follow Henderson, Storeygard and Weil (2011) and use luminosity at
night as a proxy for development. Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2012) provide
numerous cross-validation checks of the luminosity variable showing that it correlates
well with various proxies of development across regions in Africa. The satellite night
light data are available from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.34
Specically, we use these data to calculate the natural log of the average luminosity at
night per km2 at the grid cell level.35
Core Results The core results are reported in Table 5. Column (1) shows that
having a conict in the grid cell makes it 15% more likely that there was a conict in
the same grid cell between 1997 and 2010. Population density, as we would expect, is
positively correlated with conict.36 Column (2) show that this nding is robust to
including some additional basic geographic and climate controls from the G-econ data:
33An earlier version of the paper reported similar results by showing how the e¤ect varies with
distance by constructing a series of dummy variables based on the percentiles in the distance distrib-
ution from an historical conict: 0-10%, 10-25%, 25-50%, 50-75%, 75-90% and 90-100%. (Having a
conict in the grid itself would register on this measure as being at 0% in the distance distribution.)
In this case, the omitted category in the results below will be furthest distance away from the histor-
ical conict (90-100%). However, these results are somewhat weaker when we control for population
density.
34These data has been used recently by Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti (2011) and Michalopoulos
and Papaioannou (2012).
35The variable is measured in 2007. We use the data on average visible stable lights and cloud free
coverages, exploiting the cleaned  and lteredversion of the data which contains the lights from
cities, towns, and other sites with persistent lighting, including gas ares. Ephemeral events, such as
res are not used. The background noise is identied and replaced with values of zero. The variable
that we use ranges from 1-63. Using ArcGIS we calculate the light density at night for each grid cell
in our data.
36The correlation with between historical and contemporary conict holds even if population density
is not used as a control.
19
distance to coast, elevation, ruggedness, average temperature, average precipitation
and area. However, the point estimate on the historical conict variable falls to 10%.
The coe¢ cients on the additional controls (not reported) show that conict is more
prevalent where there is rough terrain, possibly because rebel forces are better able to
mount insurgencies in such locations.
Column (3) of Table 5 gives the core specication with our proxy for economic
development as the outcome. Here, we nd that having an historical conict in the
grid cell reduces the (log of) the average light density in the grid cell by 8%. This
is interesting since Table 1 showed that, on the whole, grid-cells with more historical
conict had on average higher light density at night. But here we are controlling for
population density. Column (4) shows that this result is robust to including our core
controls.
Columns (2) and (4) present two sets of standard errors. The right hand number
in parentheses is adjusted for spatial correlation using the GMM method in Conley
(1999). The reader will see that these are essential the same as those which cluster at
the country level.
Thus, we have a positive correlation between historical conict and contemporary
conict and a negative correlation with economic development.
Robustness We now explore the robustness of the core ndings by including a num-
ber of di¤erent controls. Many of these relate to concerns about other variables that
historical conict could be correlated with while others reect recent ndings from re-
search explaining patterns of economic development in Africa. We report symmetric
sets of results where conict is an outcome (Table 6) and light density at night is an
outcome (Table 7). In both tables, we include the log of population density and the
basic geographic and climate controls from G-econ which were included in columns (2)
and (4) in Table 5.
We begin with conict as an outcome. In column (1) of Table 6, we add an
additional control to reect a concern that conicts in history were mainly around
urban centres and hence historical conict is proxying for this. It may also be the
case that such conicts were more likely to have been recorded. To look at this,
we include a dummy variable which is equal to one if the grid cell contained a city
in 1400.37 This variable is positive and signicant increasing the probability of there
37This is a dummy variable which is equal to one if there was a city with a larger population of
20,000 in 1400, and zero otherwise. The underlying data are from Chandler (1987).
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being a recent conict in the grid cell by 14%. The specication in column (1) of Table
6 also includes dummies for whether grid cells are located in the domain of an historical
African kingdom where violent conict was also more likely to have been organized and
documented. To investigate this, we used the historical maps of pre-colonial African
kingdoms in the period 1500-1800 to locate each grid cell in an historical kingdom.
Thus, we are able to calculate whether each grid cell is inside the area of inuence
of an historical African kingdom and use this to construct a dummy variable which
is equal to one if the grid cell is located in a particular historical kingdom and zero
otherwise. The historical kingdom dummies are strongly signicant with a p-value of
0.000.38 However, the core correlation between having an historical conict in the grid
cell and more recent conict remains.
Another natural concern is that our core correlation is confounded by omitting
ethnic diversity. To examine this, we include a dummy variable which is equal to
one if there is more than one ethnic group within a grid cell level and zero otherwise
using data on ethnicity from Murdoch (1959).39 Column (2) shows that there is no
correlation between the probability of conict and this measure. But importantly,
given our focus, the core correlation with having an historical conict in the grid cell
remains of similar size and signicance.
Column (3) adds a measure of slave extraction at the grid cell level using the data
in Nunn (2010).40 This is positively correlated with recent conict as we also found
in Table 2, although it is not statistically signicant at the grid cell level. The core
correlation with having an historical conict in the grid cell remains.
Column (4) addresses the concern that conicts may be predominantly near to the
38Positive and signicant dummies are found for Zulu, Kilwa, Luba, Rwanda, Buganda and a
negative and signicant e¤ect for Merina, Malawi, Lunda, Axum, Kush. The remaining dummies are
not signicant di¤erent from zero, i.e. not di¤erent from parts of Africa that are not classied as parts
of any historical kingdom.
39Murdock (1959) is based on the geographical location of ethnic groups on 1800. For
these data, we make use of the GIS coding of the data by Nathan Nunn available at:
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/nunn/data_nunn The results are similar if we use data
from the Geo-referencing of Ethnic Groups (GREG) data which geo-references ethnic groups around
the world (see Weidmann et al, 2010.)
40To construct slave extraction at the grid level, we combine information on the distribution of ethnic
groups from Murdock (1959) with the information on slave exports, the number of people taken as
slaves by each ethnicity between 1400 and 1900, from Nunn and Wantchekon (2010). We rst calculate
slaves per km2 for each ethnic group. Since Murdock provides information on the geographical location
of the ethnic groups, we then calculate for each grid the km2 of the grid belonging to each ethnic
group. For each grid cell, we can calculate the total slaves exported multiplying the total km2 of the
grid belonging to an ethnic group by the slaves per km2 of this ethnic group.
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current capital city so that having a conict in the grid cell is really just a proxy for
this. When we include whether the capital city is in the grid cell, we nd that having a
more recent conict is 15% more likely. And being closer to the capital in the distance
distribution also predicts being more likely to have a conict in the grid cell. However,
even after introducing these controls, the correlation between contemporaneous and
historical conict at the grid cell level remains positive and signicant, with the size of
the e¤ect being similar.
Column (5) of Table 6 includes the jurisdictional hierarchy variable used inMichalopou-
los and Papaioannou (2012) averaged at the grid cell level. This variable, based on
data in Murdock (1967), measures the strength of political organization above the local
level in the pre-colonial period; it is an ordered variable with range between 0 and 4.41
Once again the core correlation between historical conict and more recent conict
remains and is similar in both size and signicance to the core result.
Column (6) in Table 6 includes additional economic controls. From the G-econ
data, we include the share of income generated from minerals. To get a handle on more
historic economic activities, we use the historical maps to classify regions according
to their principal economic activities in the 1500-1800 period.42 This addresses the
concern that the historical conict variable proxies for persistent economic di¤erences
between areas which provoke conict (the left hand arrow in Figure 1). We include
these economic activity dummy variables in column (6). Finally, we include the value
of light density at night in 1992 as a right hand side variable. This is measured prior to
the period for which we are measuring contemporary conict. The historical economic
activity variables are strongly jointly signicant with a p-value of 0.000:43 The size of
the coe¢ cient on having an historical conict remains of similar magnitude.
Finally, column (7) includes all of the controls from columns (1) through (6) simul-
41A value of 0 means a stateless society; a value of 1 denotes petty chiefdoms and 2 paramount
chiefdoms. Values 3 and 4 denotes large states. Murdock (1967) measures this for 1270 ethnic groups.
We use the data from Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2012) whose painstaking work matches 534
ethnicities to 490 ethnic homelands. To construct a grid-country level measure, we use the fraction of
the grid belonging to each ethnic group matched by Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2012). Given
that data on some ethnicities are missing, we assume that all groups for which we have no information
are stateless. The results are robust to normalizing instead so that the weights on populations for
which we do have data sum to one.
42The activities are growing/producing/mining bananas, barley, camels, cattle, coconuts, copper,
cotton, donkeys, ensete (a type of banana), sh, goats, gold, honey, horses, iron, ivory, leather, millet,
palm oil, plantain, ra¢ a cloth, rice, salt, sorghum, timber, wheat, and yams.
43A positive and signicant e¤ect is found for regions producing barley, goats, honey, gold, ivory,
plantain, and timber with a negative and signicant e¤ect for camels, cattle, sh, leather and ra¢ a
cloth.
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taneously. Having a conict in the grid cell now makes it 8% more likely that there
was some form of conict in the 1997 to 2010 period.44
The on-line Appendix (Table A.5) reports some further results based on codifying
conicts between 1700 and 1820 using the same method as we did for the period 1400
to 1700. We have also tried to separate between those that had some kind of European
involvement from those which did not. Two interesting ndings emerge. First, non-
European conict between 1700 and 1820 is correlated with contemporary conict.
Second, conict between 1400 and 1700 is positively correlated with non-European
conict between 1700 and 1820.
Table 7 runs through a similar array of robustness checks for our economic develop-
ment outcome measure. The core nding from Table 4 is robust to all of the additional
controls from Table 5; having an historical conict in the grid cell reduces light density
at night by around 10%.
Summing Up This within-country evidence paints a picture which is consistent with
the collective wisdom of the literature linking conict and economic outcomes.45 Taken
together, Tables 6 and 7 suggest that our core ndings on historical conicts and their
correlation with contemporary conict and economic development is a robust one.
Returning to the schematic outline of possible channels in Figure 1, the results
suggest the possible importance of an economic channel in addition to that working
through trust and identity which identied in Table 4. However, we are unable to test
44We also conducted three other unreported robustness checks using available historical variables.
The main aim with these was to check that these additional variables are not potentially ommitted
variables which are correlated with historical conict. First, we checked whether our main nding
is robust to controlling for the number of Christian missions in the locality using data from Nunn
(2010). He identies three types of missions: Protestant, Catholic and British and Foreign Bible
Society Missions, showing historical persistence in conversion to Christianity. We use Nunns map to
locate missions in our grid cells and include whether there is any mission in a grid cell as a control in
explaining the location of contemporary conicts. Only Protestant missions are (positively) correlated
with recent conict and the core result is robust. Second, we used data on early European explorer
routes between 1768 and 1894 used in Nunn and Wantchekon (2011). Here we use the map to locate
exploration routes within our grids to have a sense of which conicts are in more or less historically
remote locations. We created a dummy variable if any early explorer route passed through the
grid and include this in the regression explaining conict at the grid level.We found no signicant
correlation between this variable and contemporary conict. However, our core result is robust. We
have also explored interaction terms across old kingdoms and using distance to the coast but these
are not signicant. Finally, following Fearon and Laitin (2010), we looked to see whether conicts
are more likely to arise on the borders of countries and whether the correlation with historical conict
is stronger in such areas. While we conrm the idea that conict is more likely near borders, there
is no heterogeneous e¤ect with respect to historical conict.
45See the discussion in Blattman and Miguel (2009).
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further for this in these disaggregated ndings due to the fact that the Afrobarometer
does not collect data in conict areas. As we mentioned above, persistent conict
may be due to the interaction between geography, natural resources and patterns of
settlement which spawn particular institutional arrangements. Some of these factors
are controlled for directly, the results suggest that what remains and provides our stable
and robust correlation may well be due to the persistence of such hard-to-measure
institutional factors.
The fact that we nd results when we look within countries is not inconsistent with
the ndings in Table 3 since the source of within-country variation means that we
are controlling for a whole host of country level di¤erences.46 Our e¤orts to control
for other historical factors makes us more condent that we are not just seeing an
e¤ect coming through from persistent initial conditions such as slavery and pre-colonial
political centralization.47
5 Conclusions
This paper has shown that there is a correlation between historically recorded conicts
in Africa between 1400 and 1700 and the more recent experience of civil conict (and
political violence). This relationship is robust to exploiting between-country and
within-country variation as well as to including a wide variety of controls. Country
level attitudes also appear to have been inuenced by conict. We have also found
evidence that the regional pattern of development within countries is correlated with
the pattern of historical conict. Hence the ndings are consistent with the view that
historical conict has both a political and economic legacy.
The paper has used a comparatively unexplored source of data on recorded conicts
which we think has the potential to inform future studies of conict and will doubt-
less receive more scrutiny as it becomes more frequently used. However, even if the
historically recorded conicts on which we base the empirical analysis is incomplete,
it seems likely that the bias is towards conicts which are among the most salient to
current citizens. Moreover, this might explain why such recorded historical conicts
are negatively correlated with trust and positively correlated with identifying most
46This source of variation is also exploited in Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013).
47On-line Appendix Table A.7 reports ratios based on Altonji et al (2005) and nd that unobserv-
ables would have to be 1.2 to 4 times greater than observables for unobserved heterogeneity to be
problematic for the interpreation of these results.
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strongly with an ethnic group. This follows a long tradition in social science which
sees identities as important social categories with real consequences. More generally,
the ndings add further fuel to the idea that some phenomena that we see in the world
today are, at least in part, the product of historical legacies. Moreover, the results
are consistent with other recent research on the persistence of civil war. Fearon and
Laitin (2012) show that extra-state wars before 1945 are strongly related to civil war
after 1945.
One reaction of the ndings could be to create a sense of despair that much of
what we see is historically determined and hence not easily amenable to manipulation.
But that conclusion is too bleak. To the extent that there are headwinds in the
face of progress which are due to historical legacies, it is better to understand them
than to ignore them. The need to embed our theories of institutional change in an
understanding of social structures shaped by history opens up many possibilities for
research and for providing policy advice which is appropriately tailored to the particular
circumstances in which it is given.
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FIGURE 1: Historical Legacies 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2: Map of Conflicts, Colonial Rule and Historical Kingdoms 
 
 
 
 
  
TABLE 1:   
Descriptive Statistics 
(Countries) 
 
Variable Mean 
 
Standard Deviation Number of observations 
 
               Historical Conflict 
 
                Historical Conflict                  Historical Conflict 
 Full 
sample 
 
No  Yes Full 
sample 
No Yes Full 
sample 
No Yes 
Civil war 
prevalence (years) 
 
3.02 2.24 4.62 6.31 5.71 7.35 49 33 16 
Purges (average 
number of riots 
between 1960-
2004) 
 
0.07 0.05 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.10 49 33 16 
Conflict (ordered 
variable: 1 if 
purges >0 and 2 if 
civil war>0) 
 
1.08 1 1.25 0.78 0.79 0.77 49 33 16 
War prevalence 
1400-1700 (years) 
 
5.55 0 17 15.71 0 24.1 49 33 16 
Slave trade 
(natural log of the 
total number of 
slaves exported 
between 1400 and 
1900) 
 
9.56 9.05 10.59 3.59 3.74 3.11 48 32 16 
Log of Population 
Density in 1400 
 
0.19 0.01 0.55 1.28 1.46 0.74 48 32 16 
Log of GDP per 
capita in 2000 
(PWT 6.2) 
 
7.59 7.70 7.36 0.92 1.00 0.70 49 33 16 
Expropriation Risk 
(scale 1-7; average 
value for years 
1983-97) 
 
5.86 6.17 5.39 1.26 1.25 1.16 35 21 14 
Checks and 
Balances (average 
by country for 
years 1960-1999 for 
which the PolityIV 
variable xconst > 
4) 
 
0.12 0.15 0.06 0.33 0.37 0.25 48 32 16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1 (continued): 
 
(Grid Cells) 
 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Number of observations 
 
                     Historical Conflict 
 
                   Historical Conflict                     Historical Conflict 
 Full 
sample 
 
No Yes Full 
sample 
No Yes Full 
sample 
No Yes 
Conflict 1997-2010 
(dummy) 
 
0.40 0.39 0.84 0.49 0.48 0.36 3546 3495 51 
Old conflict in grid 
(dummy) 
 
0.014 0 1 0.12 0 0 3546 3495 51 
City in 1400 
(dummy) 
 
0.009 0.008 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.34 3546 3495 51 
Ethnic diversity 
dummy 
 
0.70 0.70 0.84 0.37 0.45 0.36 3321 3350 51 
Slave trade (natural 
log of the total 
number of slaves 
exported between 
1400 and 1900) 
 
2.39 2.35 4.90 3.38 3.35 4.45 3294 3244 50 
Capital City in the 
grid (dummy) 
0.015 0.014 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.32 3546 3495 51 
          
Jurisdictional 
Hierarchy 
0.865 0.85 1.59 0.94 0.93 1.00 3294 
 
3350 51 
Natural Log of light 
density at night  
2007 
 
1.211 1.21 1.28 0.24 0.23 0.22 3420 3369 51 
Natural Log of 1+ 
light density at 
night  1992 
 
0.102 0.09 0.27 0.32 0.32 0.41 3420 3369 51 
Log Population 
Density in 1990 
 
1.513 1.47 4.11 2.16 2.15 1.42 3496 3445 51 
Mining Share (the 
share of the gross 
product produced 
by minerals in 1990) 
 
0.015 0.015 0 0.12 0.12 0 3494 3443 51 
 
Notes: Sources as stated in the text. 
TABLE 2: 
Political Violence 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)   
Dependent 
variable 
Civil war 
incidence 
Civil war 
incidence 
Purges Purges Conflict 
(ordered 
variable) 
Conflict 
(ordered 
variable) 
Civil war 
incidence 
Purges Conflict 
(Ordered 
variable) 
  
War 
prevalence 
1400-1700 
0.12*** 
(0.05) 
0.13** 
(0.06) 
0.002*** 
(0.0005) 
0.002*** 
(0.00) 
0.07*** 
(0.03) 
0.07* 
(0.04) 
0.10** 
(0.05) 
0.002*** 
(0.0005) 
0.07* 
(0.04) 
  
Other controls 
 
 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
  
Slave exports 
 
      0.86*** 
(0.32) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
1.08* 
(0.63) 
  
Population 
Density in 
1400 
 
      1.07 
(1.23) 
0.0005 
(0.008) 
1.07 
(1.12) 
  
Colonial  and 
region 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
  
Observations 49 47 49 48 49 48 47 47 47   
R2 0.4211 0.7843 0.4800 0.4847   0.8440 0.9132    
Pseudo-R2     0.1419 0.1699   0.6627   
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** 1% significant, ** 5% significant, * 10% significant).  Sample is all African countries for which data is available. Civil war incidence is 
the number of years that the country has been in civil war since independence. War prevalence 1400-1700 is the number of years in which the country was involved in an historical 
conflict. Historical conflicts which happened the same years but in different regions are counted separately.  Other controls are: GDP per capita in 1970, latitude, longitude, minimum 
rainfall, maximum humidity, low temperature, the log of the length of the coastline, a dummy for whether a country is an island, regional variables, measures of natural resource 
abundance, legal origin, ethnic polarization, proportion of the population that is Muslim, a dummy for yellow fever, and the ruggedness of the terrain. From columns (7) through (9) 
we include slave trade variable from Nunn (2008) along with population density in 1400 from Nunn and Puga (2012).  
 
TABLE 3: 
   GDP and Institutions  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Dependent varible GDP per capita 
in 2000 
 
GDP per capita 
in 2000 
GDP per capita 
in 2000 
Expropriation 
Risk 
Checks and 
Balances 
War prevalence 1400-1700 
 
-0.01 
(0.005) 
-0.01* 
(0.005) 
-0.01 
(0.006) 
0.00 
(0.010) 
-0.00 
(0.004) 
Other controls  Yes Yes 
 
  
Slave exports 
 
  -0.07* 
(0.04) 
  
Population Density in 
1400 
  -0.08 
(0.13) 
  
Colonial  and region dumies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 49 48 48 35 47 
R-squared 0.4265 0.8947 0.9127 0.9358 0.6694 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** 1% significant, ** 5% significant, * 10% significant).  Sample is all African countries for which data is available. GDP per capita in 2000 
comes from PWT6.3. The expropriation risk variable is from ICPRG. Checks and Balances comes from the PolityIV dataset. War prevalence 1400-1700 is the number of years in which 
the country was involved in an historical conflict. Historical conflicts which happened the same years but in different regions are counted separately.  Other controls are: GDP per 
capita in 1970, latitude, longitude, minimum rainfall, maximum humidity, low temperature, the log of the length of the coastline, a dummy for whether a country is an island, regional 
variables, measures of natural resource abundance, legal origin, ethnic fractionalization, proportion of the population that is Muslim, a dummy for yellow fever, and the ruggedness of 
the terrain. Column 3 includes slave trade variable from Nunn (2008) along with population density in 1400 from Nunn and Puga (2012).  
  
                                                                                                   TABLE 4: 
 
Trust and Identity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Dependent 
variable 
 
Inter group  Ethnic 
Identity 
National 
Identity 
Inter group  Ethnic 
Identity 
National 
Identity 
       
War prevalence 
1400-1700 
-0.01*** 
(0.004) 
0.001* 
(0.0007) 
-0.02*** 
(0.002) 
-0.02*** 
(0.005) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
-0.02*** 
(0.002) 
 
Civil war 
prevalence 
    
-0.01 
(0.01) 
 
0.003 
(0.002) 
 
-0.0001 
(0.007) 
Colonial 
dummies 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes yes Yes Yes 
Observations 17419 17564 17564 17419 17564 17564 
R-squared 0.1095 0.0417 0.1385 0.1095 0.0417 0.1385 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clusterd by village in parentheses (* 1% significant, ** 5% significant, * 10% significant).  The dependent variable are individual responses to trust, ethnic 
identity and national identity from the Afrobarometer. Regressions are individual level and control for age, age squared, gender,  education, occupation, religion, living conditions, 
district level ethnicity. We also include  all of the country controls used in  Tables 1 and 2.  War prevalence 1400-1700 is the number of years in which the country was involved in an 
historical conflict. Historical conflicts which happened the same years but in different regions are counted separately. Civil war prevalence is the number of years that the country has 
been in civil war since independence (the dependent variable used in Table 2).  
 
 
TABLE 5: 
 
Conflict and Light Density in Grid Cells: Core Results 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Dependent variable Conflict 1997-2010 Conflict 1997-2010 Log of light 
density in 2007 
Log of light 
density in 2007 
Historical conflict in grid 0.15*** 
(0.04) 
0.10*** 
(0.04) (0.04) 
-0.08** 
(0.03) 
-0.08** 
(0.03)(0.03) 
lpopdensity 0.08*** 
(0.01) 
0.09*** 
(0.02)(0.005) 
0.06*** 
(0.01) 
0.06*** 
(0.02)(0.005) 
Geographic and climate  controls  Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3496 3378 3388 3282 
R-squared 0.3942 0.4478 0.3844 0.4151 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses (*** 1% significant, ** 5% significant, * 10% significant).  Variable descriptions 
are explained in text. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if there has been at least one conflict in the cell acording to ACLED during the period 
1997-2010. Log of light density in 2007 is the natural log of the average luminosity at night per km2. Historical conflict in grid is a dummy variable 
which is equal to one if there was a conflict in the grid cell between 1400 and 1700. Geographical and climate controls are: distance to coast, 
elevation, ruggedness, average temperature and average precipitation, and area from the Yale University Geographically Base Economic Dataset 
(G-econ).  All columns include country dummies and log population density from G-econ. The alternative standard errors on the right hand side 
in columns (2)  and (4) adjust the standard errors for spatial correlation using the GMM method of Conley (1999). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 6: Conflict in Grid Cells (Robustness)  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Historical Conflict in Grid 
 
0.10*** 
(0.04) 
0.10*** 
(0.04) 
0.10*** 
(0.04) 
0.09*** 
(0.04) 
0.09** 
(0.04) 
0.08** 
(0.04) 
0.08** 
(0.04) 
City in 1400 
 
0.14*** 
(0.09) 
     0.09 
(0.08) 
Pre-colonial kingdom dummies 
(p-value) 
Yes 
(0.000) 
     Yes 
(0.000) 
Ethnic diversity dummy  0.03 
(0.02) 
    0.04* 
(0.02) 
Slave exports 
 
  0.003 
(0.006) 
   0.002 
(0.005) 
Capital City in Grid    0.15**** 
(0.06) 
  0.07 
(0.06) 
Distance to capital 0-10%    -0.10* 
(0.05) 
  -0.07 
(0.06) 
Distance to capital 10-25%    -0.14*** 
(0.05) 
  -0.10* 
(0.06) 
Distance to capital 25-50%    -0.12** 
(0.05) 
  -0.09 
(0.06) 
Distance to capital 50-75%    -0.07** 
(0.04) 
  -0.05 
(0.04) 
Distance to capital 75-90%    -0.006** 
(0.03) 
  -0.04 
(0.03) 
Jurisdictional  Hierarchy     0.007 
(0.01) 
 0.002 
(0.01) 
Log of Light density in  1992      0.12* 
(0.06) 
0.09 
(0.06) 
Mineral sahare      -0.09 
(0.08) 
-0.07 
(0.08) 
Economic activity dummies(p-
value) 
 
     Yes 
(0.00) 
Yes 
(0.00) 
Country dummies 
& Table 4 Controls 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3377 3275 3183 3378 3275 3249 3160 
R-squared 0.4605 0.4504 0.4413 0.4525 0.4499 0.4607 0.4658 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses (*** 1% significant, ** 5% significant, * 10% significant).  Variable descriptions are in the text. The dependent variable 
is a dummy which is equal to one if there has been at least one conflict in the grid cell according to ACLED during the period 1997-2010. Historical conflict in grid is a dummy variable 
that captures whether the grid cell had a conflict located between 1400 and 1700. Geographical and climate controls are as in Table 5: distance to coast, elevation, ruggedness, average 
temperature and average precipitation, and area from the Yale University Geographically Base Economic Dataset (G-econ).  All columns include country dummies and the log of 
population density from G-econ. Column (1) includes a dummy variable which is equal to one if the grid cell contained a city in 1400. It also includes dummies for whether grid cells 
are located in the domain of an historical African Kingdom. Column 2 includes  a dummy that has value 1 if there is more than one ethnic group in the grid cell. Slaves is a measure of 
slave extraction at the grid cell level using the data in Nunn (2010). Capital City in the grid is a dummy that has value 1 if the grid cell contains the capital city. Distance to capital at 
x%, is a dummy that has value 1 if the grid cell has a distance to the capital which is in the percentile x. Jurisdictional hierarchy variable is the one used in Michalopoulos and 
Papaioannou (2012) averaged at the grid cell level. Log of light density in 1992  is the natural log of the average luminosity at night per km2.  Mineral share is the share of income 
generated from minerals from G-econ. Economic activity dummies, are dummy variables for the different economic activities between 1500-1800. 
TABLE 7: Light Density in Grid Cells (Robustness) 
 
 (1) (2 (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Historical Conflict in Grid 
 
-0.09** 
(0.04) 
-0.08** 
(0.03) 
-0.086** 
(0.03) 
-0.11*** 
(0.03) 
-0.09** 
(0.04) 
-0.11*** 
(0.02) 
-0.11*** 
(0.02) 
City in 1400 
 
0.22** 
(0.09) 
     0.02 
(0.03) 
Pre-colonial kingdom dummies 
(p-value) 
Yes 
(0.00) 
     Yes 
(0.00) 
Ethnic diversity dummy  -0.002 
(0.01) 
    0.006 
(0.007) 
Slave exports 
 
  0.004 
(0.004) 
   0.004 
(0.003) 
Capital City in Grid    0.23*** 
(0.04) 
  0.01 
(0.03) 
Distance to capital 0-10%    -0.08 
(0.05) 
  -0.07* 
(0.04) 
Distance to capital 10-25%    -0.10* 
(0.04) 
  -0.07* 
(0.03) 
Distance to capital 25-50%    -0.10** 
(0.04) 
  -0.07** 
(0.03) 
Distance to capital 50-75%    -0.10*** 
(0.04) 
  -0.07*** 
(0.02) 
Distance to capital 75-90%    -0.06** 
(0.03) 
  -0.05*** 
(0.01) 
Jurisdictional  Hierarchy     0.02 
(0.01) 
 -0.001 
(0.006) 
Log of light density in 1992      0.52*** 
(0.05) 
0.51*** 
(0.04) 
Mineral share      -0.21*** 
(0.07) 
-0.20*** 
(0.06) 
Economic activity dummies(p-
value) 
     Yes 
(0.00) 
Yes 
(0.00) 
Country dummies 
& Table 4 Controls 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3281 3275 3183 3282 3275 3249 3160 
R-squared 0.4538 0.4143 0.4194 0.4402 0.4180 0.7182 0.7430 
 
Notes:Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses (*** 1% significant, ** 5% significant, * 10% significant).  Variable descriptions are explained in text. The dependent 
variable is the natural log of the average luminosity at night per km2 in 2007.  The dependent variable is a dummy which is equal to one if there has been at least one conflict in the 
grid cell according to ACLED during the period 1997-2010.  Geographical and climate controls are as in Table 5: distance to coast, elevation, ruggedness, average temperature and 
average precipitation, and area from the Yale University Geographically Base Economic Dataset (G-econ).  All columns include country dummies and log population density from G-
econ. Column 1 includes a dummy variable which is equal to one if the grid cell contained a city in 1400. It also includes dummies for whether grid cells are located in the domain of 
an historical African Kingdom. Column 2 includes a dummy that has value 1 if there is more than one ethnic group in the grid cell. Slaves is a measure of slave extraction at the grid 
cell level using the data in Nunn (2010). Capital City in the grid is a dummy that has value 1 if the grid cell contain the capital city. Distance to capital at x%, is a dummy that has value 
1 if the grid cell has a distance to the capital which is in the percentile x. Jurisdictional hierarchy variable is the one used in Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2012) averaged at the grid 
cell level. Log of light density in 1992  is the natural log of the average luminosity at night per km2 in 1992.  Mineral share is the share of income generated from minerals from G-econ. 
Economic activity dummies, are dummy variables for the different economic activities between 1500-1800. 
 
